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Savings Banks and Community Development: 
A Remedy for Runaway Capital 
by George Henderson and Paul S. McAuliffe 
The authors are both third year law students at Yale 
Law School. After law school, George Henderson intends 
to practice in Houston, Texas and Paul McAuliffe 
plans to practice in Washington, D.C. The draft 
legislation discussed in this article was originally 
prepared for Yale Legislative Services and submitted 
to the Consumer Protection Subcommittee of the 
General Law Committee of the Connecticut General 
Assembly. 
Economic development of the inner-city is one of the 
decade's most pressing political and social problems. 
No politician today makes a major domestic policy 
speech without appropriate reference to bringing the 
ghetto into the "mainstream" of American society. 
However, there is no general agreement on the proper 
approach to accomplishing this goal. 
Our basic assumption in this article is that the 
pivotal element of the process of increasing inner-
city wealth-production is the free access to "risk" 
capital for new enterprise. Even cursory study of 
the history of American industry leads to the con-
clusion that without the initial influx of British 
investment money the American industrial machine 
would not have been built so rapidly nor have become 
self-sustaining at such an early date. Assembling the 
essential factors of production - industrial plant, 
machinery, skilled labor and management, technological 
advances - requires a substantial initial capitaliza-
tion; if the inner-city is to realize the potential of 
its labor force, it must find the capital or credit to 
build the apparatus necessary to use that asset in 
wealth production. This is all fairly common economic 
doctrine. Of course, it would be foolish to suggest 
that an ample supply of risk capital or credit will 
solve all the problems of economic development of the 
inner-city; however, all the skill and potential of a 
people and a community cannot increase their wealth 
without it. 
The shortage of capital in the inner-city today is 
easily measured. First, the difficulties that citizens 
of the inner-city experience in trying to obtain 
capital and credit through the normal investment money 
outlets of the American economy are well known. 1 
Economic statistics uniformly indicate the poverty of 
the inner-city areas. Not only is there personal' 
poverty (as illustrated by the familiar range of 
unemployment and income-level statistics 2 ), but 
there is little social overhead (as measured by 
housing, health care, education, crime and drug 
addiction statistics). To begin building all the 
institutions of an economically developed community -
hospitals, schools1 industries and housing - requires 
huge outlays of development capital. 3 
This needed capital is not available from the 
significant sources of capital in the United States, 
including commercial banks, 4 the securities market, 
and existing industrial corporations. As Theodore 
Cross indicates: 
"No profit opportunities exist (in the inner-city) to over-
come the chaotic economic dis-incentives which act as a 
barrier to moving established outside capital into the slum 
... Credit is not exported to the ghetto because the ghetto 
borrower is risky, unpredictable, and unreliable."5 
Large commercial banks, in short, are afraid of inner-
city loans. This fear is probably not altogether 
rational, or predicated entirely on business considera-
tions, since in the white economy loans are made even 
when there is a statistical certainty of some failure. 
Only recent social and political pressure has induced 
established industrial and commercial enterprises to 
build and invest in the inner-city. And this effort 
has been too small to make a real difference. 
The problems encountered by the individual minority 
businessman in attempting to finance his operations 
are not very different from those faced by the 
community development corporations and other minority 
enterprises. Obtaining funds from the federal govern-
ment, the primary source of cash, requires a long 
upstream pull through the red tape of the bureaucracy. 6 
But the government units of the country will supply 
only a fraction of what the inner cities need. The 
costs of economic development, over and above what the 
government will supply or guarantee, must be assumed 
by inner-city residents themselves. The only people 
who can overcome the "economic disincentives" of the 
inner-city are those who live there. Inner-city people 
either individually or collectively must develop their 
own wealth producing apparatus - which in turn will 
create the tax base which can produce health, educa-
tional and cultural institutions which are essential 
to a decent standard of living. Any non-romantic 
reading of American politics must lend itself to this 
interpretation. 
Thus it is essential that people of the inner-city 
find a viable credit or capital outlet to serve their 
many pressing needs. We believe that savings banks, 
community institutions existing mostly in urban areas, 
may be able to provide some of this capital and credit. 
Their accumulated surplus of investment funds 7 and the 
manner in which these funds are now regulated by the 
states suggest, as we shall attempt to show, a unique 
opportunity for leaders of the country's decaying 
inner-city areas to obtain the capital they need to 47 
1
and : Savings Banks and Community Development
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 1972
48 
begin genuine development efforts. 
Savings Banks: The potential and the practice. 
The potential of existing mutual savings banks as a 
capital source for the revitalization of urban areas, 
for community development, and for the support of 
minority enterprises should not be underestimated. 
The savings bank sector of the banking industry is a 
rapidly growing one that controls enormous wealth. 
At the close of 1970, the 494 mutual savings banks 
in the country held total assets of approximately 
$79 billion, representing an increase of 97% in the 
ten years since 1960. The time deposits held by these 
institutions accounted for approximately 18 per cent 
of the total funds held in individual savings accounts 
at the close of 1970. 8 
In certain sections of the country, the economic 
importance of savings institutions is even more pro-
nounced than national figures indicate. Due primarily 
to the restrictions imposed by state-chartering, most 
savings banks are located in New England, the Middle 
Atlantic states and the Pacific Northwest. This 
concentration amplifies their role in the economy of 
these particular regions. Indeed, in five states -
New York, Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, 
and Maine - mutual savings banks hold more savings 
than commercial banks and savings and loan associa-
tions combined. 9 
In certain local areas, the dominance of savings 
banks in the local savings market is even more 
striking. In several major metropolitan areas in the 
East, savings banks, in spite of competition from 
commercial banks and savings and loan associations, 
hold over half of the total volume of savings 
deposits. These areas include New York, Boston, 
Buffalo, Providence, Albany-Schenectady-Troy, 
Bridgeport, New Haven, and Hartford. In several 
others, including Philadelphia, Newark, and 
Rochester, N.Y., savings banks outrank either of 
their competitors. 10 The consequence of this 
geographically concentrated power enjoyed by savings 
banks is that their investment policies play a 
crucial, if not determinative, role in the economic 
development of these regions. 
In spite of this regional concentration, savings 
banks are a major source of funds in the national 
housing market. Traditionally, savings banks have 
channeled their funds into long term investments, 
primarily mortgage loans. In 1970, mortgage holdings 
represented 73 per cent of their total assets. As a 
result, savings banks play a key role in mortgage 
markets. They rank first among all types of 
financial institutions in holdings of FHA and VA 
mortgages, holding more than one-fourth of mortgage 
debt guaranteed by the federal government. Because 
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their mortgage investments are concentrated in 
"owner-occupied residential housing," savings banks 
are the second largest source of non-farm residential 
mortgages of all types in the country. 11 Further-
more, a significant portion of this mortgage lending 
is on properties outside the state where the lending 
bank is chartered. 
That mutual savings banks have developed such sizable 
economic power is testimony to the diligence and 
efficiency with which these institutions have pursued 
the savings dollar of middle- and lower-income 
Americans. Mutual savings banks were originally 
established to encourage thrift by providing a 
financial institution where relatively small savings 
could be deposited safely and with profit. 12 Many 
of the first savings banks restricted the size of 
accounts to relatively small deposits. Today these 
restrictions still remain at several banks, and, in 
some states, have been written into law. 13 Thus, 
even today, savings banks rely primarily on the small 
depositors: as of June 30, 1970, 60.2 per cent of the 
individual savings accounts in the.se banks showed a 
balance of less than $1,000. 14 Furthermore, these 
depositors are almost exclusively people who live or 
work within the immediate area served by the bank. 15 
In addition, in most states savings banks may not 
accept deposits from any commercial enterprise; only 
individuals and non-profit organizations may hold 
accounts. 16 
This deposit pattern has certain implications that 
must be considered in determining the proper invest-
ment role of savings banks. Unlike commercial banks 
and life insurance companies, mutual savings banks do 
not, and are not expected to, finance large corpora-
tions. Rather, a savings bank is expected to pursue 
an investment policy that serves the best interests of 
its depositors, who are the low- and middle-income 
residents of the town or city in which the bank is 
located. The structure of these banks, that is as 
mutual institutions with sharp restrictions on 
branching, implies the same. 
It has long been assumed, by savings bankers and their 
critics, that this purpose of promoting the financial 
welfare of lower income depositors was served by sound, 
conservative investment policies which assured security 
and guaranteed a reasonable return on the savings 
dollar. Whether this narrow view of the purpose of 
savings banks is justified today is open to serious 
question. Would not the best interests and needs of the 
depositors be better served by investment policies 
oriented to local economic development and urban 
redevelopment? But would the pursuit of such an 
investment policy be inconsistent with the traditional 
conservative money management principles of savings 
bank management? If so, how should these tensions be 
resolved? 
Whatever the ideal resolution of this conflict, there 
is considerable doubt whether the current investment 
policies pursued by savings banks serve the best 
interests of their main depositors and the local 
community. The largest savings banks are located in 
large cities, and their depositors are primarily city 
49 
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residents. Despite the desperate need for capital to 
rebuild inner-city housing and to finance community 
development, savings banks export the capital 
raised from inner city residents. Today 39. l per 
cent of the mortgage holding of savings banks are on 
out-of-state property. These out-of-state holdings are 
concentrated in California, Florida, Texas, and 
Virginia, none of which is known as capital-poor. 17 
Over 48 per cent of the mortgage holdings of savings 
banks are FHA and VA underwritten mortgages; this ties 
savings banks into the single family residential-
suburban patterns of these institutions. 18 The net 
effect of these investment policies is that suburban 
growth is financed with capital raised in the city. 
This policy of exporting capital, in addition to 
reducing the amount of capital available for inner city 
development, increases the living costs of the very 
city residents who contribute this capital. As 
suburbs continue to expand, financed to a great extent 
by capital made available through savings banks, the 
relative position of the inner city in the American 
economy declines. The upper and middle classes migrate 
out to suburban areas followed by businesses in search 
of qualified labor and more accessible markets. The 
net effect of this trend is to decrease the property 
tax base of the inner city. Municipal expenditures 
are then financed through higher property tax rates. 
A recent authoritative study indicated that, with a 
few exceptions, per capita property tax revenues are 
significantly higher in inner cities than in their 
suburbs. 19 Furthermore, the same study demon-
strated that residential property taxes are extremely 
regressive since property tax payments constitute a 
significantly larger portion of the budget of lower-
income families, whether they rent or own their 
dwellings, than of their wealthier counterparts. 20 
Thus, the low and middle-income inner-city resident 
suffers significant financial detriment because 
suburban expansion chips away at the inner city tax 
base. Savings bank investment policies that fuel this 
suburban expansion hardly serve the interests of 
inner-city residents. 
The irresponsible performance of the savings banks in 
refusing to recognize the needs of their depositors 
and the community in which they exist dictates a re-
examination of the legal and political structure in 
which they operate. 
The need for critical examination by the legislature 
of savings banks and their investments is made more 
compelling first, by evidence that savings bankers in 
certain areas have consciously induced and supported 
the concentration of racial minorities in the inner 
city and second, by pressures for the adoption of 
federal charter legislation for mutual savings banks. 
Hearings before the Antitrust and Monopoly Sub-
committee of the Senate Judiciary Committee held in 
Boston in September of this year reveal that the 
Boston Banks Urban Renewal Group, a consortium of 
Boston area savings institutions, had tightly regu-
lated the flow of federally supported home mortgages 
that were available to blacks so as to maintain a 
pattern of separate black and white communities. 21 
Loans were available only on homes within the 
specified boundary lines drawn by the banking cartel. 
Minority citizens were thus unable to obtain mortgage 
financing in other parts of Boston. And certain 
neighborhoods within "the area" were subject to the 
destructive cycle of speculation and blockbusting. 
The impact of this program of urban renewal, 
supposedly beneficial to minority groups, was aptly 
described by a minority group representative at the 
hearings. 
"Real estate brokers just didn't show houses outside the 
area because they knew that the banks would reject mortgage 
applications for.them ... The BBURG coalition had decided 
where the black community could live ... [The whole system] 
limits free competition and access to banks that whites enjoy 
in shopping for mortgages under a free enterprise system."22 
The Subcommittee plans to hold further hearings, 
examining similar allegations in other major cities. 
The attempt on the part of the savings bank 
industry to persuade Congress to adopt a system of 
nationwide federal chartering for mutual savings insti-
tutions provides a second reason for re-examining the 
investment practices of savings banks. 23 If enacted, 
federal charter~ would enable the savings bank 
industry to expand into 31 additional states, in-
creasing their economic power in the process. The 
federal chartering movement presents an excellent 
opportunity to reevaluate existing policy towards 
savings banks and to shape more enlightened policy for 
the future. 
Unfortunately, there has been little indication in 
congressional proceedings to date that any major 
revisions of policy can be expected. The most recent 
federal chartering bill to receive committee approval, 
the Federal Savings Institution Act of 1967, pro-
posed essentially to adopt the existing patterns of 
state regulations in the federal sphere. The major 
concern expressed by the committee was the need to 
assist savings banks in performing their traditional 
role as a source of funds for the national mortgage 
market. 24 Hearings held on the proposed legislation 
produced only bickering among commercial banks, 
savings banks, and savings and loan associations over 
how the national savings pie should be divided. 25 The 
viewpoints of those who may have· sought revisions in 
the traditional loan and investment policies of 
savings institutions were not represented at the 
hearings, nor were they recognized in the committee 
report. Congressional policy should not be predicated 
on such a one-sided legislative record. 
In terms of the development of the inner-city, it is 
crucial that public interest representatives illuminate 
the social irresponsibility of savings banks and 
present constructive proposals for reform when the 
battle for federal chartering is renewed in Congress. 
Furthermore, federal chartering need not be viewed 
only as a means of reform. Whatever their faults, 
mutual savings banks have proven to be effective 
institutions for accumulating capital. The mutual 
savings bank provides an excellent model upon which 
to structure new institutions specifically designed to 
raise capital in lower-income communities and to apply 
this capital to the economic development of such 
communities. Federal legislation should not seek solely 
to reform existing banks - a task that may prove 
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extremely difficult due to the inbred conservatism and 
the political clout of these banks. If "federal 
chartering" legislation were enacted which incorpo-
rated the specific structure, disclosure, and invest-
ment regulations we propose later in this article, 
the opportunity would be ripe for inner-city commun-
ities to create new savings banks particularly 
oriented to inner-city capital and credit needs. 
Savings Banks: The legal framework. 
1. Internal Organization 
The evolution of the early savings banks into so-
called "modern" savings institutions has been sub-
stantially uniform throughout the country. The pattern 
in Connecticut is representative. 26 · 
Typically, savings banks have been founded by small 
groups of individuals within a community who pool 
their financial resources and petition the state 
legislature for a charter to operate a bank in their 
community. The initial charter granted by the legisla-
ture then designates this group as the "incorporators" 
or "trustees" who are empowered to manage the bank. 
Each charter granted by the legislature also 
names another group, the "corporators" or "members 
of the corporation," usually between ten and twenty-
five members in size. There are no limits on the 
terms of office of the corporators, and the group is 
self-perpetuating, selecting new members by internal 
election. This body has powers analagous to those of 
the shareholders in a regular corporation: it elects 
the board of trustees and any other boards necessary 
for the management of the bank's business, and pre-
scribes the by-laws under which the bank operates. 
The board of "trustees" is responsible for over-
seeing the management of the bank and for deciding 
major issues of bank policy. In the early days of each 
bank, the trustees usually managed the business per-
sonally, but as the bank expands the trustees usually 
find it necessar¥ to appoint officers to oversee every-
day activities. 2 The state charters of these banks 
and the relevant state statutes give few guidelines for 
the selection of new corporators or trustees. The 
standard (though not universal) practice is to select 
as trustees only persons who are also corpora tors, and 
to select both groups with an eye toward representing 
various business, financial, and professional interests 
in the community. 28 
Neither by charter, statute, nor by-law do the de-
positors of a savings bank have any vote or direct 
voice in selecting officers or of influencing bank 
policies. Within the bank, the corporators and trustees 
are legally accountable only to themselves. 
While minor variations upon this pattern exist from 
state to state, two essential features are common to 
all of the states where savings banks have been char-
tered. First, the bank is managed by, and its policies 
are determined by, a closed, self-perpetuating group. 
Some states limit the terms of trustees and specify a 
fixed retirement age. None, however, has restricted 
this self-perpetuation, not even the Western states 
such as Washington, which adopted its savings bank 
statutes in 1955. 29 Second, in no state do depositors 
have any formal voice in the formulation of bank 
policy, not even the right to elect officers or 
trustees. 
2. Statutory Regulation of Investment 
The legislatures of the several states have prescribed 
rather complex re%ulations for the investment activity 
of savings banks. 3 However, this regulation 
largely provides statutory support for the natural 
inclination of savings bank management toward conser-
vative, secure, and protected investment policies. 
The usual pattern is for the legislature to authorize 
investment in a specified class of investments and to 
prescribe the maximum percentage of assets a savings 
bank may place in that class. Only investments thus 
authorized are permitted. Rarely does a state require 
that a minimum percentage of a savings banks total 
investments be devoted to a particular use. Again, 
Connecticut is exemplary of the standard pattern. The 
applicable Connecticut statutes 31 authorize invest-
ment, up to a fixed maximum limit, in federal, state, 
and municipal, and other public sector bonds and obli-
gations; in bonds and obligations of specified public 
utilities and railroads; in bank and insurance company 
stocks; in various types of real estate construction 
and mortgage loans; and a limited amount of install-
ment and educational loans. In addition, a residual 
category authorized investment of up to 8% of the 
bank's assets in debt securities issued by "corpora-
tions incorporated and doing a major portion of their 
business in the United States which in the opinion of 
the savings bank making the investment ... are prudent 
for it to make." 32 This requirement of prudence 
tends to limit such holdings to non-speculative, 
"blue chip" securities. In addition, the charters 
of the individual banks all require that their funds 
"be used and improved to the best advantage. " 
Again, "best advantage" has commonly been construed 
from the narrow viewpoint of the investment analyst. 
Overseeing this maze of banking regulations in Connec-
ticut, for instance, is the Bank Commissioner who 
reports annually to the Governor. 33 Prior to his 
report, the Commissioner is directed to examine each 
bank "to determine if it is complying with the law." 34 
As the basis for this determination, each savings bank 
must report annually its financial condition to the 
Commissioner, and at least once a year the Commis-
sioner 's office conducts an examination and audit. 35 
The primary regulatory function of the Banking 
Commission is the promulgation each year of a "legal 
list" specifying those investment securities which 
are legall~ permissible investments under applicable 
statutes. 6 Through this device, he is able to 
police the statutory mandate quite effectively. 51 
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The major result of such statutory regulation of 
investment is to reinforce and assure conservative, 
traditional money management by bank officers. The 
unfortunate corollary is that savings bank management 
is discouraged, indeed prohibited, from expanding the 
traditional, narrow view of its investment responsi-
bilities to a view that is more aware of and respon-
sive to the economic development needs of the 
communities it purports to serve. 
3. Federal Tax Provisions 
As with any other business, the legal framework within 
which savings banks operate cannot be fully understood 
without studying the impact of federal income taxation 
upon savings bank investment policies. The major tax 
carrot which policy-makers offer to savings banks is 
the income tax deduction for "bad debt reserves." 
The 1969 Tax Reform Act attempted to manipulate this 
deduction to encourage investment in residential real. 
estate mortgages. 37 The effect is to provide some 
incentive, the strength of whfoh is not entirely 
clear, for investment by savings banks in residential 
real estate mortgages. Since savings banks, as we have 
seen, already invest considerable amounts in residen-
tial real estate mortgages, this legislation is not 
expected to affect many changes in basic investment 
policy. Moreover, the policy lying behind this manipu-
lation of the "bad debt reserve" deduction is open 
to serious question. One doubts that the proper 
governmental policy towards savings banks, at this 
juncture. is to encourage even more investment in 
suburban, ranch-house mortgages. 
Savings Banks: Proposal for reform. 
The financial resources of savings banks are a source 
of capital funds that could be redirected from ultra-
saf e governmental, residential, and commercial invest-
ments to meet inner-city capital and credit needs. 
Savings banks presently have a surplus of funds 
accumulated by careful, conservative investrnent; these 
banks can begin to address the money needs of the 
inner-city. However, in order to bring about a shift 
in savings bank investment policies, it will be 
necessary to do more than morally exhort the small, 
internally selected group of "corporators" and 
"trustees" who today control savings bank policies. 
Realistic attempts at reform should consider not 
only changes in manner of selection of the bank 
directors and in the definition of the "constituency" 
to which these directors must finally be responsible, 
but also major changes in the state laws that 
presently regulate savings bank investment policies. 
This section presents and discusses the alternatives 
which community action groups may present to their 
legislatures for consideration and adoption. · 
1. Depositor Election of Directors. 
One way of reforming the selection of savings bank 
directors is to have the depositors of each savings 
bank elect the directors for that bank. Depositor 
control of savings banks is not such a radical sugges-
tion as one might think. The 1964 Federal Savings 
Bank Bill contained provisions for depositors election 
of directors. 
"Except in the case of initial directors and directors of 
converted institutions with grandfather rights, directors of 
Federal savings banks are normally to be elected by the 
depositors. The (Federal Home Loan Bank] Board is given 
power to provide by regulation for the terms of office of 
directors; the manner, time, place and notice of election; 
[and] the minimum amount and holding period ... giving rise 
to [a] voting right ... "38 
Amendment could easily provide for the conversion to 
elected directors instead of selected trustees, thus 
shifting the control of funds, at least indirectly, to 
depositor pressure. The theoretical justification of 
such a proposal is that direct accountability to 
depositors will exert institutional pressures upon 
bank management to be more attentive to the needs 
and desires of the depositors in formulating bank 
policies. 
Although al workable system of depositor election of 
directors probably could be devised, one must take 
into consideration several difficulties which are 
likely, in practice, to reduce the effectiveness of 
election devices in affecting the investment policies 
of the banks. 
First, there is no assurance that the depositors are 
sufficiently concerned or knowledgeable about bank 
affairs to engage in efforts to upset the present 
applecart so long as their dividends are regularly 
paid. Their interest in an adequate return on their 
savings may deter them from arguing strongly for 
"public interest" investments. A further barrier to 
the meaningful effect of depositors on directors is 
the absence of exact data on the uses of savings bank 
investment policy has permitted savings bank manage-
ment to substitute statements of concern about urban 
crisis for positive investment policies that could 
assist in urban development. Only when disclosures are 
more meaningful will it be possible to have depositors 
make informed choices about the policies of the bank 
or the nominees for directorships. 
These difficulties do not cancel out all the merits of 
a scheme of depositor election of directors. Depositor 
selection of directors of course does not guarantee 
that depositors will have effective control of the 
investments of all savings, banks. It does, however, 
create the possibility that community groups might 
influence some savings banks whose policies vitally 
affect their economic and social well-being. In the 
long run, probably only relatively well-organized and 
highly motivated community groups and organizations 
will develop the "depositor voting power" necessary 
to alter the existing investment policies of conserva-
tive savings banks. But the possibility that some 
communities may not take full advantage of depositor 
control, should not mean that depositor control be 
denied to all communities. The ideals of free enter-
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prise and individual opportunity that presumably 
pervade government economic regulation require that 
active communities be given every opportunity to 
advance themselves. 
2. Lifting the "prudency" standard 
Another and rather obvious mode of reform of savings 
bank investment policies is to change the state 
statutes which presently regulate investments. If 
savings banks are to devote their substantial assets 
to more socially productive ends, road blocks imposed 
by state regulations of savings-bank investment 
policies must be removed. Savings banks are often 
prohibited from so-called "high-risk" investments by 
state laws which set a "prudency" standard for 
savings banks. Any legal and political campaign to 
make savings banks more responsive to social needs 
should include a relaxation of these stringent legal 
requirements. Few problems would be presented in the 
drafting of new legislation along these lines; in most 
states, an addition or amendment to the existing 
section of the present statute which specifies the 
classes of "legal investments" for savings banks 
would suffice. Such an amendment would simply allow a 
savings bank to invest up to a fixed maximum per-
centage of its assets in socially-productive, high-
risk investment such as low- and moderate-income 
urban housing, debt or equity securities issued by 
minority enterprises, community development corpora-
tions, and similar operations. 
, Such an amendment would be an excellent first step in 
a long-range strategy of legal reform. The savings 
banks would be unable to lobby against it with any 
credibility, since it merely authorizes the banks to 
serve public needs as they see fit. If the amendment 
includes provisions for periodic review of the vigor 
with which savings banks are exercising their new 
authority, the savings banks may be spurred to change 
existing policies to prevent the legislature from 
adopting requirements that savings banks must invest 
in socially productive enterprises. 
3. Minimum percentage of "risk" investments 
Another path of legislative reform of savings banks 
could be the adoption of a "minimum required percen-
tage" approach. A state legislature could fix a 
certain percentage of a savings bank's investment 
portfolio which must be placed in certain types of 
desirable but relatively risky investments, such as 
low-income housing or small businesses in the local 
community. The rationale for such legislative action 
is that savings banks, in the course of their standard· 
"risk minimizing" investment policies, are unlikely 
to devote sufficient investment funds to socially 
beneficial purposes in the absence of authoritative 
regulation requiring such investments. 
One advantage of this technique, if the proper formula 
is chosen, is that a more desirable allocation of 
investment would be mandated. However, there are a 
number of potential problems associated with such an 
approach which should be considered. 
\\ 
First, the "minimum required percentage" formulas 
must be carefully drafted so that the banks are not 
required to undertake too many high-risk projects, 
thus threatening the safety of their deposits. 
Second, because only the legislature could make 
changes in this required percentage the formula would 
be relatively inflexible. Savings banks should be able 
to adjust their investments to changing market circum-
stances, often on short notice. A statutory formula 
would not be likely to give bank directors the 
requisite flexibility necessary for sound management. 
While these problems may not be insuperable, this 
approach, since it does tamper with the basic prin-
ciple of management discretion, may involve serious 
risks of harm to depositors. Furthermore, the adminis-
trative and enforcement costs will be high, as will 
the cost in time and effort of frequent statutory 
revision. Such risks and costs are acceptable only if 
the benefits of this method are significantly greater 
than those of alternatives. This does not appear to 
be the case. 
4. Community Control 
Achieving changes in the investment activity of mutual 
savings banks - with little disruption to the current 
structure of these institutions - could perhaps be 
accomplished by establishing a series of mechanisms 
for allowing the community to exert pressure on the 
management of savings banks. Legislation could be 
drafted which would impose general "development 
investment" responsibilities upon savings banks; which 
would require savings banks to disclose complete and 
specific data on their investment portfolios; which 
would authorize a state administrative agency to 
create a "development investment" plan for each 
savings bank in the state; and which would grant both 
the administrative agency and depositors of each bank 
the authority to exert formal pressure to increase 
the extent to which the investment portfolios of each 
savings bank matched the "development investment" 
plan adopted by the state agency. 
This section of our article sets out and examines in 
some detail the major provisions of draft legislation 
we prepared for the Connecticut legislature. 39 The 
particular measures and language proposed here do not 
purport to.end discussion on the subject of changing 
savings bank investment patterns. Rather, our intention 
is to highlight the problems that any legislation on 
savings banks must deal with, and to suggest one set 
of solutions to these problems. 
General statutory duty. Legislation designed to 
achieve changes in the investment patterns of savings 
banks shol)ld contain a statement of the general 
"public-interest responsibilities" which the legisla-
ture believes the investments of savings banks should 
serve. These "public-interest responsibilities" 
should be translated into a concrete definition and 
exposition of both the specific type of investments 
by savings banks which meet these responsibilities and 
the duty of savings banks to make these investments. 
In draft legislation for the Connecticut legislature, 
we proposed the following: 53 
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"l. Development investments shall include 
(a) any direct mortgage loan made for any of the purposes set 
forth in subsection (g) of this section; 
(b) secured or unsecured loans made for any of the purposes 
set forth in subsection (g) of this section; 
(c) shares or interests in mortgages or loans originated by 
other lenders, whether secured or unsecured, made for the 
purposes set forth in subsection (g) of this section; 
(d) purchases of, or loans made on the security of, the 
securities or stock of public or private bodies engaged in 
activities promoting the purposes of subsection (g) of this 
section; and 
(e) direct ownership of any interest or interests in the 
foregoing loans, mortgages, or securities, or in real property, 
which real property is used as the principal office and place 
of business of the bank, or a branch thereof. 
(g) The purposes the foregoing investments shall seek to 
promote are -
1 - the economic or social development of disadvantaged or 
minority persons or groups, or 
2 - the improvement of areas of poverty or decay in all areas 
of the state, or 
3 - inner city real estate development, management or 
construction. · 
"2. Unless inconsistent with applicable federal or state 
statutes or regulations, each mutual savings bank is autho-
rized and directed to make development investments and each 
bank shall make such investments in a manner which will 
promote and assist the economic, physical, human, social, 
and community development of the area in which the office of 
each bank is located." · 
A general statement of legislative intent, above, 
serves several purposes. First, it tells bank offi-
cials (and the courts) that the "prudent man role" 
should not be applied to prohibit the potentially 
"risky" investments that an aggressive, socially-
oriented investment and financing program is sure to 
include. 40 Second, because the statutory obliga-
tion is "general," it is readily adapted to the 
particular circumstances that any one savings bank 
may encounter. It is likely that the development 
needs and related capital requirements of different 
regions within a state will vary considerably; thus, 
the local savings bank, if it is to be genuinely 
responsive to community needs, market conditions, 
government regulation, and subsidy programs, should 
have flexibility in tailoring its own development 
investment program. 
Finally, these two sections - the first defining 
"development investments" and the second expositing 
a general duty to make "development investments" -
provide a base for other legislative provisions 
which create mechanisms to enforce compliance with 
the statutory obligation to conduct development 
investment activities in accordance with local social 
needs. 
Disclosure. Prior to formulation of intelligent 
"development investment" plans, all interested 
parties must possess relevant data on the present 
investment activities of the bank. We propose disclo-
sure to state officials and the public at large of the 
current investment program of each savings bank. Since 
this data is already in the files of the individual 
banks, a requirement that the banks disclose it to 
the public should impose no great financial or 
administrative burden on the banks. In addition, 
disclosure is certainly a more efficient means of 
acquiring the relevant data than administrative 
investigations and public hearings. In order to 
insure compliance with the disclosure requirement, 
legislation should include penalties for failure to 
disclose properly and adequately all required data.· 
The required data should include a description of the 
general categories of non-development investment loans, 
complete with the amount invested in each category, 
the city or area where these investments are located, 
and the amount invested at each location. 41 For 
the development investment category, the savings bank 
should provide a detailed description of each invest-
ment, specifying the amount, the geographic location, 
and the type,of activity supported (e.g., shopping 
centers, office buildings, multiple-unit low-income 
dwellings, FHA home-owner mortgages, community 
development corporations, etc.). Legislation should 
also authorize an appropriate administrative official 
to issue regulations requiring such further disclosure 
of any other data as may be needed to fully delineate 
the proper development investment policies for a 
particular savings bank. 
Because the purpose of this legislation is to 
encourage a pattern of investment more consistent with 
the economic, physical, and human resource develop-
men t of the state and local community, legislation 
should require disclosure to all state and local 
officials charged with responsibility for executing 
programs or formulating state, regional, or local 
development plans. Disclosure should be broadly man-
dated so as to encompass officials related to every 
program which could benefit from the coordination of 
savings bank development investments. 
Furthermore, legislation should provide for publica-
tion of this data, summarized in the form of an annual 
report, in a local newspaper of general circulation in 
the community in which each particular savings bank 
operates, so that interested members of the community 
may have access to the reports at relatively little 
expense and with no administrative obstacles. 
The Investment Plan. After disclosure has been made, 
each administrator of a program or agency concerned 
with the development investment policy of savings 
banks would be required to evaluate the investment 
patterns revealed by this disclosure. Obviously, the 
administrator would be using the "development 
investment" criteria set out in the legislation. 
After analysis of the investments of each, each 
administrator would submit a written statement 
setting out in detail the changes he thinks are 
required to bring the investment pattern of each bank 
within the statutory investment standard. This state-
ment would go both to the bank and to a state 
administrative agency designated in the legislation 
to co-ordinate savings bank investment policy. 
The purpose of this interchange between the agency 
and the bank would be to isolate the points of conten-
tion between the administrators and the bank's manage-
ment. These written statements would set out those 
local investments which are, in the opinion of each 
administrator, available to the bank as "development 
investments." 
The next stage in our proposal is the formulation of 
specific "development investment" plans for each 
savings bank. One effective procedure that could be 
adapted to this task is the administrative method 
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presently utilized by the Department of Labor and the 
Office of Federal Contract Compliance in the formula-
. ti on of the so-called "Philadelphia Plans." In the 
Philadelphia Plan procedure, one administrative agency 
is required to "approve" a.detailed plan which is 
based upon proposals submitted by affected public and 
private parties. This approval is contingent upon an 
administrative finding that the plan submitted is in 
compliance with the standards set out in the governing 
statute. 
In the context of savings bank regulation, the legisla-
tion for this administrative process would take the 
following form. First, written into the legislation 
would be a requirement that detailed investment pro-
grams shall be developed by each bank and certified 
by a designated administrative agency of the state. 
Second, the legislation would set forth criteria to 
be used by the administrator in determining whether 
a particular plan warrants approval. For example, 
we made the following proposal in our legislative 
draft: 
"In determining whether to approve the proposed development 
investment program of a bank, the administrator shall con· 
sider the following factors: 
(1) the projected financing requirements of inner-city 
businesses; 
(2) the projected financing requirements for low-cost 
housing; 
(3) the availability of capital for these purposes from 
other sources, either public or private." 
Third, the legislation would spell out a procedure 
for the certification of these plans. Banks would 
propose their specific plan for restructuring their 
·investments, as stated above. In addition, community 
residents, individually or in groups, would be per-
mitted to propose alternative plans. These plans would 
be presented at administrative hearings at which all 
parties submitting plans would be entitled to partici-
pate. The administrator would be permitted to propose 
amendments to these various plans either before or at 
the hearings. The administrator would be permitted to 
propose amendments to these various plans either 
before or at the hearings. The administrator would 
then be directed to construct and certify the final 
plan which in his determination most adequately ful-
fills the statutory requirements. 42 
Each bank would have the statutory authority to 
obtain judicial review of its certified plan, if it 
wished to do so.43 Finally, legislation should 
provide for state agency certification of new 
development investment plans at two or three year 
intervals. 
Implementation and Enforcement. Once the develop-
ment investment plan has been certified, the bank 
would implement the investment policy contained in 
the final plan. But without some enforcement 
mechanism, genuine bank compliance might be difficult 
to obtain. Savings banks, even if they are operating 
in good faith, will tend to define in the narrowest 
terms the type of investment sufficient to constitute 
compliance with the plan. The administrative agency 
which approved the development investment plan would 
be granted power to enforce compliance with the plan 
through the use of court orders, in much the same 
manner as federal agencies presently do. 
Nevertheless, the probability of strong and effective 
enforcement by the state agency is seriously weakened 
by at least three factors: (1) such agencies seldom 
have sufficient staff to effectively police all of the 
banks in the state, (2) the local nuances of each 
development investment plan will not always be visible 
to an administrative staff responsible for policing 
banks throughout the state, and (3) state agencies 
have traditionally been unwilling energetically to 
enforce regulations concerning private enterprise. 
Therefore, we have proposed that legislation for 
regulating savings banks include authorization for a 
private suit by depositors against their savings bank 
for the purpose of insuring compliance with the 
certified development investment plan.44 
The major problems involved in using a private suit 
for enforcing compliance with the administratively 
approved plan are: (1) the difficulties of proof and 
specification of remedy that the depositor will face 
when he brings suit and (2) the possibility of 
harassment suits.45 In the draft legislation, a 
cause of action exists when a depositor has alleged 
in good faith (1) that a plan for investments has 
been developed and approved as specified by statute, 
(2) that such plan has been in existence for six 
months, and (3) that the savings bank has not achieved 
compliance with the plan. 
In presenting his case, the depositor-plaintiff 
would have the benefit of two reputable legal tools. 
The first of these would be his discovery rights 
against the bank: he would be allowed to secure from 
the bank the information and evidence necessary to 
prove a failure of the bank to comply with its approved 
investment plan. This would ease the burden of ob-
taining evidence for trial. 
The second device would be a rebutable presumption, 
created by the statute, that the savings bank has 
failed to comply with its development investment plan 
if the plaintiff has introduced any evidence that the 
bank has not met the requirements of the certified 
plan. Without this presumption the plaintiff would 
have to introduce evidence which proved by a prepon-
derance of the evidence (I) the terms of the certified 
plan, (2) the existence of the certified plan for 
longer than six months and (3) a failure on the part of 
the bank to implement the certified development invest-
ment plan. The last element is obviously the most 
difficult to prove. But with the statutory presumption 
the plaintiff will make his case upon the introduction 
of any evidence that shows a failure of the bank 
to implement the plan and will thus shift the burden 
of going forward with further evidence onto the bank, 
the party to the suit with total access to the critical 
evidence. 
For the bank to overcome this presumption of non-
compliance (which would be sufficient to warrant 
judicial intervention), the savings bank would have to· 
show to the satisfaction of the court (I) that it has 
committed all the resources it can to the execution 
of the development investment plan, (2) that external 
conditions, such as banking regulations or financial 
environment, have so changed from the time the plan 55 
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was approved to render compliance with plan an undue 
burden or (3) that the investments of the bank con-
stitute compliance with the requirements of the 
approved investment plan. The defense by the savings 
bank that it has not complied with the plan because 
of an exercise of discretion or judgment on the part 
of the bank's directors would be specifically 
excluded. 
To keep the court from acting as a "savings bank 
loan review board," legislators should carefully 
consider what remedies should be available to the 
depositor-plaintiff. If the relief requested by the 
plaintiff is beyond the scQpe of the development 
investment statute, the bank can raise this as an 
affirmative defense. The remedies we envision are 
equitable orders that require the bank to take such 
steps as will produce compliance with the certified 
developmentinvestment plan within six months or a 
year; in some cases the order could be more specifi-
cally drawn, directing the particular bank to make a 
certain dollar amount of loans to one of the specific 
categories contained in its development investment 
plan. If the bank demonstrates a genuine inability to 
meet its plan obligations, the court order should 
make appropriate adjustment in the degree of compliance 
the bank must attain. Finally, the order should con-
tain provisions for a review of the performance of 
the bank after six months or a year; upon review, and 
if warranted, the court could hold the bank in contempt. 
During the period that the order is in effect, all · 
other suits based on our proposed statute would be 
stayed; if the order expires and the bank upon review 
is found to be in compliance with the plan, the first 
decision would be res judicata for a year or 
eighteen months, or until a new plan is approved. 
Liberal joinder and notice provisions in the statute 
would insure mat all interested parties, including 
amici curiae, had opportunity to participate in the 
main suit against the bank. 
"People Banlcs": Conclusion 
Legislation directed toward reform of savings bank 
investment policy will not be adopted until legislative 
inertia and the lobbying power of savings bank are 
overcome by political pressure from capital-starved 
groups. We have operated from three basic assumptions 
in this article: 
(1) that minority entrepreneurs and other persons 
engaged in development activity in the inner-city will 
seek financial assistance from savings banks; 
(2) that development activities and minority busi-
nesses are a net benefit to the inner-city community 
affected, and 
(3) that savings banks, as unique financial insti-
tutions in our society, are constitutionally ame_nable 
to legislative regulation. 
We have attempted to present, in some detail, the 
various ways in which the funds now held by savings 
banks could be channeled into development investments. 
At the heart of these proposals is the idea that 
savings banks have a special obligation to their 
depositors and their communities to do all that they 
can for the development of those communities. It is 
clear enough that the funds are needed; we have tried 
to make clear various ways in which the use of these 
funds could be influenced by persons and groups not 
currently in positions of control in the savings 
bank structure. 
Depositor election of directors, fixed percentage 
rules, and administrative/judicial enforcement of 
statutory policy are all realistic mechanisms that 
can push savings banks toward what they advertise 
themselves to be - "people banks!" Federal charter-
ing of savings banks, a proposal favored by the 
savings bankers' associations and likely to be 
scheduled for Congressional hearings in the near 
future, provides a prime opportunity for policies of 
savings banks by moving for federal legislation 
similar to that we have suggested for the states. · 
The savings bank has long enjoyed a secure life, 
funded by local depositors, supported by the community, 
and sustained by favorable state legislation. Now it is 
time for these banks to return past favors by partici-
pating significantly in the development of viable 
inner-city communities. 
1. For example, see the statement of Sen. Charles Percy 
(R.-111.) before the Sub-Committee on Financial Institutions 
Senate Banking and Currency Committee, Hearings on Private 
Investment in the Inner City, 90th Cong. 2nd Sess. (1968). 
2. According to the most recent results of the 1971 
Current Population Survey, between 1969 and 1970, the number 
of blacks and whites below the low income level increased. 
By 1970, there were 7. 7 million blacks and 17 .5 million 
whites who were below the low income level compared to 7 .2 
and 16.7 million low income blacks and whites, respectively, 
in 1969. These absolute figures represent 10% of the white 
population of the country and 32% of the non-white popula-
tion. In major metropolitan areas nearly half of the blacks 
lived in poverty areas, as compared with 10% of the whites. 
The poverty level was defined in the Special Study as · 
follows: "The low income threshold for a non-farm family 
of four was $3,968 in 1970, $3,743 in 1969, $2,793 in 1959. 
In 1970, the low income threshold ranged from about $2,500 
for a family of two persons to $6,400 for a family with 7 
or more persons." The Social and Economic Status of 
Negroes in the United States, 1970, Census Bureau, Dept. 
of Commerce Current Population Reports, Series P-23, No. 
38, at 35. 
3. This analysis sets to one side the large questions of 
ownership of these potential "means of production," the 
training of the inner city labor force, the allocation of 
this capital to the various neects of the community, the 
distribution of new wealth, and the problems of developing 
new wealth-producing industries which produce significant 
numbers of jobs in the present economic structure. 
4. See Note, Commercial Banks and Minority Entrepre-
neurship, SO Yale L.J. 614, at 620, 627 (1971). 
5. T. Closs, Black Capitalism: A Strategy for Busi-
ness in the Ghetto 58 (1970). 
6. Under Title 1-D S 2763-2768 of the 1964 Economic Oppor-
tunity Act, a major source of federal financing for business 
in the ghetto, funds are available to private organizations 
proposing "economic and business development programs [to) 
provide financial and other incentives to business to locate 
in or near the areas served, [programs] for small businesses 
in or owned by residents of such areas ... , and manpower 
training programs." A key restriction on the availability 
of these funds is that only a limited number of projects 
will be funded by the Director of the Office of Economic 
Opportunity in any area in hopes that projects funded will 
be of "sufficient size and scope to have ~.n appreciable 
impact on the area served." 42 USC S2764. The person 
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seeking the loan bears the burden of proof in this deter-
mination, not only of the economic soundness of his 
proposal but also of the qualification of the propo~d 
project under the terms of the Act. 
The Public Works and Economic Development Act of 1965, 
42 USC §3121. et seq., provides another example of the handi-
caps which minority enterprises inust overcome to obtain 
federal funds. Section 3142 authorizes loans and loan 
guarantees for private businesses in areas designated under 
the Economic Development Act as "redevelopment areas," S316, 
only when ten special conditions are met, S3142(b). The most 
interesting condition is the requirement of S3142(b) (2) 
that any applicant, public or private, must "have been 
approved for such assistance by an agency or instrumen-
tality of the State or political subdivision thereof in 
which the project to be financed is located," which State 
agency must be concerned with the economic development of 
the State. 
See also§ 3142 (a) (10) requiring a plan of develop-
ment for the area and a state finding that the proposal will 
be consistent with such plan. A positive effect of this type 
of requirement is to promote some co-ordination of federal 
funds and local plans, but it also has the negative effects 
of channeling funds only to those persons who cooperate with 
the local persons even slightly beyond the accepted politi-
cal boundaries of the area. It is frequently the less-
acceptable, more radical groups or persons that will be 
most effective in arousing community ir:iterest in resourc1>-
utilization projects. 
7. The surplus accounts of savings banks insured by. 
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation represented 7.3% 
of the total assets of savings banks and 7. 7% of the assets 
of savings banks other than cash or government securities, 
1969 Annual Report of the Federal Deposit Insurance Crop. 
268 Table 109. These percentages represent a total of 
$4,697,716,000. 
8. National Association of Mutual Savings Banks, 
National Fact Book of Mutual Savings Banking - 1971 
8-9, 41. (Hereinafter cited as 1971 Fact Book.). 
9. Id. at 41. 
10. Id. at 48. 
11. Id. at 8, 49;Report of the President's Com· 
mission on Urban Housing, "A Decent Home" 130 (1968). 
12. A Teck, Mutual Savings Banks and Savings and Loan 
Associations: Aspects of Growth 4 (1968). (Hereinafter 
cited as Teck); Hearings Before Subcommittee on Bank 
Supervision and Insurance of the House Committee on 
Bankimt and Currencv. 90th Colli! .. 1st Sess. 562 (1967). 
(Hereinafter cited as HP.nrings - 1967). 
13. Teck, at 39. 
14. 1971 Fact Book at 21. 
15. Teck, at 14;Application of Howard Savings Institu· 
tion of Newark 32 N.J. 29, 159 A.2d 113, 119 (1960). 
16. Hearings - 1967, supra, at 462. 
17. 1971FactBookat56. 
18. Id. at 27. 
19. Netzer, The Economics of the Property Tax 118, 
121-122 (1968). 
20. Id. at 46-52. 
21. See N. Y. Times, August 15, 1971 at 37; Boston Globe, 
morning edition, Tuesday, Sept. 14, 1971 at 3; Wed. Sept. 
15, 1971 at 5; Thurs., Sept. 16, 1971at5. A published 
hearing record will be available from the Antitrust and 
Monopoly Subcommittee of the Senate Judicia!'Y Committee 
in mid-November, 1971. 
22. Boston Globe, Tues., Sept. 14, 1971 at 3. 
23. An excellent summary of the moves within the federal 
government towards adoption of a system of federal charter-
ing is contained in Federal Savings Institutions, House 
Committee on Banking and Currency, Report No.1042, 
90th Cong., 1st Sess. 14-19 (1967). 
24. Id. at 4-11. 
25. See Federal Charter Legislation for Mutual Savings 
Banks - 1966, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Bank 
Supervision and Insurance of the Committee on Banking and 
Cu"ency, House of Representatives, 89th Cong., 2nd Sess., 
Feb. 23, Mar. 1 and 2, 1966;Federal Charter Legislation 
for Mutual Savings Banks - 196 7, Hearings before the Sub-
committee on Bank Supervision and Insurance of the Committee 
on Banking and Cu"ency, House of Representatives, 90th 
Cong., 1st Sess., July 13, 18, 19, 20, 1967. 
26. See generally Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann§§ 36-117 to 
36-142. 
27. Teck, at 36. 
28. Interview with officers of the Connecticut Savings Bank, 
New Haven, Ct., November 1970. 
29. See Rev. Code Wash. Ann.§§ 32.16.010 to 32.16.120. 
30. Compare the similarity of the provisions of the follow-
ing representativ~ state statutes: Conn. Gen .. Stat. Ann.secs. 
36-96 to 39-142,Ann. Laws Mass., Ch. 168, J.J. 
Stat. Ann. Secs. 17:6-52 to 17:6-63; 17:9A-174 to 17:9A-304. 
Rev. Code Wash. Ann. Ch. 32.04 to 32.98. 
31. Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann.§§ 36-94 to 36-116. 
32. Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § § 36-96 (13). 
33. Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann§§ 36-10, 36-13. 
34. Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann§§ 36-15. 
35. Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann§ §36-127, 36-15. 
36. Conn, Gen. Stat. Ann.§§ 36096 (14). 
37. Section 432 of the 1969 Act amended Section 593 of 
the Internal Revenue Code, allowing a mutual savings bank 
to claim larger "bad debt reserve" deductions (thus lower-
ing the effective current tax rate) for assets invested in 
"qualifying real property loans." "Qualifying loans" are 
so defined as to include mortgage loans on all types of 
real estate, excluding, generally, only loans to public 
instrumentalities or other banks. See I.R.C. § 593 
(e) (1). However, many banks may claim the full amount of 
this increased deduction only if at least 72% of their · 
assets a.re invested in accordance with a prescribed formula 
that includes residential real estate mortgages (of all 
income classes) but not commercial or industrial real estate 
mortgages. See I.R.C. § 593 (b) (2) (B) (ii), § 7701 
(a) (19) (C). 
38. Federal Savin!ls Bank Bill. House Subcommittee on 
Bank Supervision and Insurance, 1964, Staff Analysis, 
p. 12; cf. Federal Credit Union Act, 12U.S.C.§§1751-1775: 
''The business affairs of a Fedeml Credit Union shall be 
managed by a board of directors ... and a credit committee 
... all to be elected at the annual members' meeting by 
and from the members ... " § 1761. 
39. A complete text of the proposed legislation, drafted 
with reference to Connecticut law, is available upon request 
from the Editors. 
4U. See Liffiton v. National Savings Bank of City of 
Albany 44 N.Y. S. 2d 770, 267 App. Div. 32, Ape. Div. 
3rd Dept./1943/0pp. Den. sub nom In re Halper s Will, 
47 N.E. 2d 275, 267 App. Div. 840, Aff'd 59 N.E. 2nd 35, 
293 N .Y. 799 (1944); where the court discussed bank ma.nag1>-
ment: 
''The State has made stringent provisions for the administra-
tion of savings banks and bearing in mind the character of 
such institutions and the purposes for which they were 
formed, entrusted as they are with the savings of a multitude 
of poor people, there should be no relaxation of the rule 
requiring the officers and agents to exercise reasonable · 
care and diligence in the performance of their duties. The 
law makes provision for the investment of deposits and the 
dominant purpose has been to provide in this way fdr the 57 
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safety of the money entrusted to them and to hold the 
officers entrusted therewith to a strict accountability .. 
For honest errors of judgment made while acting with 
ordinary skill and prudence, measured according to the 
demands of the duties or business which they have taken 
upon themselves, they are not to be held liable. However, 
when one deposits money in a savings bank he has the right 
to expect that those in control of the institution will, 
in the management of his property, exercise the same degree 
of care and prudence, that prompted by self-interest 
generally exercise in their own affairs." 
44 N.Y.S. 2d, at 774. 
41. If savings banks object to the disclosure of general 
data about non-development investments because such dis-
closure weakens their competitive position with other 
savings banks, limiting disclosure to a detailed statement 
of development investments and a standard financial 
statement, will not weaken the statute for the purposes 
we have in mind. 
Because the statute requires the savings bank to make 
development investments, the savings bank will disclose 
every investment which it thinks qualifies as a development 
investment. The tendency will be to over-disclose so as to 
prevent enforcement proceedings, and thus to provide data 
on all the investments relevant to the purposes of this 
statute. 
42. This brief discussion of the administrative procedure 
for approval of the plans passes over certain fundamental 
problems with which all students of the law are well aware, 
and which must be taken into consideration in the formulation 
and drafting ·of a specific proposal. The choice of an agency 
to administer the program is crucial. Consideration must be 
given to the vulnerability of the agency to "capture" by 
the special interest group affected here, the savings banks; 
to whether the levels of funding and staffing of the agency 
are sufficient for the assigned task; and to the ability 
and ideology of the particular administrators likely to 
be involved. 
43. Some provision for judicial control of the exercise of 
administrative discretion is essential. The form this judicial 
control should take is a subject beyond the scope of this 
article. 
44. The propriety of privately initiated action to enforce 
public policy regarding institutions of a public nature is 
not seriously challenged today. Although there is no clear 
legislative grant of the right, private civil suits have 
been held to lie under Section l 7(a) of the Securities Act 
of 1933 on the basis of the word "unlawful." Fischman 
v. Raytheon Manufacturing Co. 188 F.2d 783 (2nd Cir. 1951) 
(Esp. n. 2); Thiele v. Shields 131 F. Supp. 416 (S.D.N.Y. 
1955); Globus v. Law Research Service, Inc. 418 F 2nd 
1276 (2nd Cir. 1969). 
Similarly, private parties asserting a public interest in 
the environmental resources of an area were held to have 
standing to sue under the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, 
33 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 
U.S.C. S701 et seq. in Citizens Committee for the Hudson Valley v. Volpe 
Valley v. Volpe 425 F. 2d 97 (2nd Cir. 1970). Rather 
than wait for judicial explication of a right for private 
suits under legislation channeling savings bank funds into 
"development investments," we would suggest that the 
statute contain a clear grant of such standing. 
45. A third possible problem is the "friendly depositor" 
suit, where the bank attempts to j!et a favorable ruling on 
its behavior before sentiment against the bank's investment 
policy has developed. This problem is easily solved by allow-
ing suits only after the investment plan has been in effect 
for a certain number of months, for instance, six months, 
and by allowing liberal joinder of plaintiffs once a suit 
is commenced. 
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